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ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to provide a perspective on the causes of
inflation by exploring why eustained inflations occur and the role of
monetary policy in the inflation process. The conclusion reached in this
paper is that in the last ten years there has been a convergence of
views in the economics profession on the causes of inflation. As long as
inflation is appropriately defined to be a sustained inflation, nacro—
economicanalysis, whether of the monetarist or Keynesian persuasion,
leads to agreement with Milton Friedman's famous dictum, "Inflation is
always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon."
However, the conclusion that inflation isa monetary phenomenon
does not settle the issue of what causes inflation because we also need
to understand why inflationary monetary policy occurs1 This paper also
examines this issue and it finds that the underlying cause of inflation
in the United States has been accommodating monetary policy geared to
achieving a high employment target. The role of expectations has been
important in the inflationary process so that to prevent the resurgence
of inflation at a minimum cost in terms of unemployment and output loss,
monetary policy must be both non—accommodating and credible.
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Introduction
The problem of inflation has been of central concern to American
policy makers since the mid 19Os. Of particular concern has been the
rise in the core (or sustained) inflation rate from below the 2'hlevel
in the early 1960s to near the double digit level by the late 1970s.
Since 1981 a rapid disinflation has occurred, bringing the current
inflation rate down to below h.Therecent decline in inflation has not
been achieved without substantial costs: in 1982 unemployment reached
the highest level in the postwar period, peaking at tQ.7'., and is cur-
rently still above the 7X level. At the present time we are at a crucial
juncture: the inflationary fire has abated, but there remains a persist-
ent worry that it might reignite. What should be the stance of
policymakers, and in particular the monetary authorities, in the current
economic environment?
This paper attempts to provide some answers to this question by
exploring why sustained inflations occur and the role of monetary policy
in the inflation process.1 The conclusion reached in this paper is that
in the the last ten years there has been a convergence of views in the
economics profession on the causes of inflation. As long as inflation is
appropriately defined to be a sustained inflation,macroeconomic
Temporary movements of the inflation rate have been substantial in
the 1970s because of the external supply shocks due to the increase
in oil prices in 1973 and 1979. This paper does not focus on these
temporary movements of inflation because they are strongly in-
fluenced by external factors that are not under the control of the
monetary authorities. See Blinder (1979) for a discussion of how
supply shocks temporarily raised inflation in the 1970s.
The last section of this paper wa deleted because it
contained a policy prescription.-2—
analysis, whether of the monetarist or Keynesian persuasion, leads to
agreement with Milton Friedman's famous dictum, 'Inflation is always and
everywhere a monetary phenomenon.'2 However, the conclusion that infla-
tion is a monetary phenomenon does not settle the issue of what causes
inflation because we also need to understand why inflationary monetary
policy occurs. This paper will also examine this issue and by so doing
provide some suggestions as to how monetary policy should be conducted
in order to prevent the resurgence of inflation at a minimum cost in
terms of unemployment and output loss.
II.
Inflation As a Monetary Phenomenon
The most persuasive evidence that Friedman cites to support his
proposition thatinflation is always and everywhere a monetary
phenomenon is the fact that in every case where a country's inflation'
rate is high for any sustained period of time, its rate of money supply
growth is also high. This evidence for the decade spanning 1972—82 is
shown in the scatter diagram in Figure 1 which plots the average rate of
inflation for 52 countries against the average rate of money growth in
this period.3 The well known relation between money growth and inflation
2Friedman (1963).
These are the 52 countries for which money supply, price level and
real output data were available in the IMF's International Financial
Statistics. A quantity theory view of money growth and inflation
would make use of a money growth variable that is adjusted for real
output growth by subtracting real output growth from money growth.
As is expected, the adjusted money growth measure is more highly
correlated with inflation than is the unadjusted money growth vari-
able used in the texts the correlation of the adjusted money growth
variable with inflation for the 52 countries is .99.Figure 1




(MG: annual rate, continuously compounded)
Source: The data used in constructing the inflation and money growth
numbers were obtained from the IMF's International Financial
Statistics Annual Yearbook 1983. Consumerprice indices
were used to calculate the inflation rates and narrowly defined
money were used to construct the money growth rates. The average
growth rates were calculated by taking the log of the 1982 value
of the CPI or money supply, subtracting off the log of the 1972
value, and then dividing by 10.—3—
is illustrated by the regression line plotted in the figureand the
correlation between inflation and money growth is found to be .9.The
country with the highest rate of inflation in this period, Argentina,is
also found to have the highest rate of money growthj while the country
with the lowest rate of inflation, Switzerland, is also the countrywith
the lowest rate of money growth.
An important feature of this evidence is that it focuses on sus-
tained or core inflation, that is, a situation where the price levelis
continually rising. Friedman's sweeping statement that inflationis
always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon thus focuses onthe long—run
phenomenon of inflation and is not concerned with temporaryinflations
in which the upward movement in the price levelis not a continuing
process.If Friedman's proposition did refer to temporary inflations
then it could be easily refuted by numerous counter examples.
The distinction between sustained and temporary inflations is an
important one in evaluating Friedman's proposition. Although articlesin
the popt.ilar press seem to indicate that monetarists and Keynesians have
a completely different view of the inflation process, thisis not the
case. Keynesian macro theory asitis currently practiced, aswellas
monetarist analysis (and its offshoot, the new classical macroeconomics
advocated by Lucas and Sargent), all support Friedman's proposition that
sustained inflations are monetary phenomena.
The best way to see the wide theoretical support behind the Fried-
man proposition is to make use of the aggregate supplyand demand
framework to see how each of the three major paradigms in macroeconomic
analysis (monetarist, Keynesian and new classical macroeconomics)view
the inflationary process. Figure 2 contains the aggregate supply and
demand diagram that shows the response of prices and output to a con——4—
tinually rising money supply, Let us first consider how this diagram
works in the context of the monetarist model. Suppose that initially we
are at Point 1where the price level is P1 and real output is at the
natural rate level of output, V, which is the level of real output that
corresponds to the natural rate of unemployment. The initial aggregate
demand curve AD1 is downward sloping in the monetarist model because
nominal income is fixed by the level of the money supply and any decline
in the price level means that there must be a corresponding rise in
sr
output. The initial short—run aggregate supply curve AS1 is upward
sloping because a rise in nominal income yields both a rise in real
output and the price level in the short run. In the long run, however,
real output will be at its natural rate level, Y: hence the long—run
aggregate supply curve is the vertical line AS1r at the real output
level of V. The diagram has been drawn so that initially the aggregate
demand and short—run aggregate supply curves intersect at Paint 1 which
is also an the long—run aggregate supply curve.
When the money supply increases, the monetarist model predicts that
nominal income will rise, thus shifting out the aggregate demand curve
to AD2.At first we might have an increase of real output above the
natural rate level, but the resulting decline in unemployment below the
natural rate will create upward pressure on wages and prices, thus
leading to a continuing shift up in the short—run aggregate supply curve
until it reaches AS where the economy is again back at the natural
rate level of output. The price level has now increased to P2 where the
aggregate demand and supply curves intersect at Point 2.A further
increase in the money supply next period shifts the aggregate demand
curve out to AD3 and the economy moves to Point 3and a higher price
level ofP3. Continuing increases in the money supply send the economyThe Response of Prices and Output












Aggregate Real Output (Y)—5—
to Point 4 and beyond. The net result of this process is that a continu-
ing rise in the price level, that is a sustained inflation, results from
agrowingmoney supply. In the monetarist model, the aggregate demand
curve only shifts as a result of changes in the money supply and so in
the absence of a high rate of money growth a sustained inflation cannot
develop. Friedmans proposition that Inflation is a monetary phenomenon
then follows1
The Keynesian analysis of the response of output and prices to a
continually rising money supply is almost identical to the scenario just
described for the monetarist model. The Keynesian model also has a
downward sloping aggregate demand curve because for .agiven money
supply, a decline in prices raises real money balances, lowers interest
rates and thereby raises aggregate demand.In addition this downward
slope in the aggregate demand curve can result from real balance effects
in which the decline in the price level raises the real value of wealth,
thereby increasing aggregate demand. The upward sloping short—run ag-
gregate supply curve and the vertical long—run aggregate supply curve
AS is alsoa feature of the Keynesian model. The Keynesian model
differs in its treatment of aggregate supply from the monetarist model
in that it views the speed of adjustment of the short—run aggregate
supply curve to its long—run position as being slower than in. the
monetarist model. While monetarists see the economy as inherently stable
with a rapid adjustment to the natural rate level of output, Keynesians
see the economy as inherently unstable with a much slower adjustment to
the natural rate level of output.
A rise in the money supply in the Keynesian model also leads to the
aggregate demand curve shifting out to AD2 because at a given price
level real money balances rise, leading to both a decline in interest-o-
ratesand a rise in the real value f wealth, thus Causing aggregate
demand to rise.Theeconomy will again head to Point 2 because the
short—run aggregate supply curve will continue to rise until it reaches
ASsr where output is at its natural rate level. Further increases inthe
money supply will move us to Point 3, 4 and so on. The Keynesian model
thus also reaches the conclusion obtained from the monetarist model: a
continuing rise in the price level, that is, a sustained inflation, will
result from a rapid growth of the money supply.
The Keynesian model, in contrast to the monetarist model, does
allow other factors besides the money supply to affect the aggregate
demand curve, specifically fiscal policy. Thus, at first glance,it
would seem that a sustained Lnflation might occur as a result of expan-
sionary fiscal policy such as increased real government spending or
decreases in taxes and that the Friedman proposition would be refuted.
However, this is not the case, Even in the Keynesian model, a sustained
inflation cannot result unless there is a rapid growth in the money
supply.
Suppose that the economy is initially at Point 1 in Figure 2and
government spending is permanently increased, shifting out the aggregate
demand curve to AD2. Initially output will rise above the natural rate
level, leading to a rise in the short—run aggregate supply curve to ASr
where output is again at Vand the price level haS risen to P2. The net
result from the permanent increase in government spending is a one—shot,
permanent increase in the price level. While the economy is moving from
Point Ito Point 2, the inflation rate will be high. Once Point 2 is
reached, however, the inflation rate will return to zero.Thus,the
permanent increase in government expenditure leads to only a temporary
increase in inflation.—7-.
In the absence of rapid money growth,a permanent increase in
government expenditure cannot lead to a continually rising price level
and hence to a sustained inflation. Only a continuing rise in government
expenditure can lead to further shifts in the aggregate demand curve1
moving the economy to Points 3, 4 etc. and yielding a sustained infla-
tion. Such a policy, however, is not a feasible one because there is a
limit on the total amount of government expenditure possible: the
government cannot spend more than 100% of SNP. In fact, well before this
limit is reached, the political process would stop the increase in
government expenditure. As is visible in recent debates about the budget
in Congress, the public and politicians have a particular target level
of government spending that they think is appropriate for our society.
Although small deviations from this level might be tolerated, large
deviations will not be, imposing even tighter limits on the degree to
which government expenditure can be increased.
Bya similar argument, lowering taxes also cannot lead to a sus-
tained inflation in the absence of rapid money growth.A permanent
decline in taxes can shift the aggregate demand curve from AD1 to AD2.
But further outward shifts in the aggregate demand curve can only occur
iftax'es are continually reduced. This process will obviously have to
stop when tax collections are zero. The outward movements of the ag-
gregate demand curve will thus eventually also have to come to a stop
and the resulting inflation will necessarily be temporary. The conclu-
sion we have reached is the following. Even in a Keynesian model, fiscal
policy cannot by itself be the source of a sustained inflation. The
Keynesian framework therefore also supports the Friedman proposition.
The new classical macroeconomics also can be cast in the aggregate
demand and supply framework of Figure 2. The advocates of new classical—B—
macroeconomics lean to Milton Friedmans position that money is all that
matters to changes in nominal income, although they are willing to
entertain the possibility that other factors influence the aggregate
demand curve. The principal difference between them and monetarist or
Keynesian economists is in their views of aggregate supply. The new
classical macroeconomics combines the assumption of market clearing
(because wages and prices respond completely flexibly to the appearance
of new information) with the assumption of rational expectations. Any
changes in the aggregate demand curve that are anticipated will lead to
changes in the short—run aggregate supply curve that leave real output
unchanged. The resulting neutrality of anticipated policy does not
affect any of the conclusions reached above. The new classical macro-
economics is also consistent with the view that inflation is always and
everywhere a monetary phenomenon.
I II.
The Causes of Inflationary Monetary Policy
To understand the process generating sustained inflation, it is not
enough to know that a sustained inflation will not occur without a high
rate of money growth. We also must understand why governments pursue
inflationary monetary policies. Because politicians and government
policy makers never advocate inflation as a desirable outcome, it must
be that in trying to achieve other goals, governments end up with a high
money growth rate and thus a higher inflation rate. There are two goals
that may lead to inflationary monetary policy: high employment and the
desire to have high government spending with low taxes.—9—
High Employment Targets and Inflation
The U.S. government is required by law in the Employment Act o+
1946,as well as the more recent Humphrey—Hawkins Bill, topromote high
employment.It is true that both of these laws state that a high employ-
ment level istobe achieved which is consistent with a stable price
level, but in practice this has often meant that our government has
pursued a full employment target with less concern about the inflation-
ary consequences of its policies.
One result of pursuing a full employment target is that the govern-
ment will engage inanactivist stabilization policy to promote high
employment,using monetary and fiscal policy toraiserealoutput and
2mployment when they fall below their natural rate levels.Howthis
activist policy can lead to a high rate o4 money growth and inflation is
again illustrated with the aggregate supply and demand aDparatus in
Figure 3. Consider a situation in which initially output in the economy
is atthenatural rate level at Point 1 where the aggregate demand curve
AD1 and the short—run aggregate supply curve ASr intersect.Ifunions
and firms decide that they want to obtain higher wages and prices and so
raisethem,the short—run aggregate supply curve will rise to a position
suchas ASSr With government monetary and fiscal policy unchanged, the
economywould move to Point A and output would decline to below its
naturalrate level, When unemployment rises as aresult, activist policy
makers with a high employmenttarget would accommodate the higher wages
andprices by implementing expansionary monetary or fiscal policy that
would raise the aggregatedemand curve tAD2, thus raising output back
up to its natural rate level.
The consequences for the workers and firms is that they haveFigure 3
A Cost-Push Inflation With an Activist Policy
to Promote High Employment








achieved their goal of higher wages and prices without the appearance of
too much unemployment. As a result they might want to try and raise
their wages and prices again. In addition, other workers and firms might
also raise their wages and prices in order not to be left behind and
suffer a decline in their relative wages and prices, The net result will
be that the short—run aggregate supply curve will shift up again, say to
AS. Unemployment would rise again when the economy moves to Point B,
and accommodating, activist policy will now again be used to shift the
economy to Point 3 by shifting the aggregate demand curve out to AD.,.
The above process can keep on continuing and the price level will
keep on rising sending us to Point 4 and beyond. The sustained inflation
that results is known as a "cost—push inflation' because it has been
triggered by the push of workers and firms to raise their wages and
prices.
At first glance it might appear as though the cost—push inflation
provides a counterexample to the Friedman proposition that inflation is
a monetary phenomenon. This is not the case because in order for a
sustained inflation to occur, the aggregate demand curve has to shift
out continually, and as the earlier discussion indicates, this can only
occur if the money supply is continually rising. If a non—accommodating
monetary policy is followed because the government is not bound to a
high employment target, then the upward push of wages and prices that
raises the short—run aggregate supply curve from AS to will not
be followed by expansionary policy to shift the aggregate demand curve
outward; instead the aggregate demand curve will remain at AD1. Now when
the economy moves to Point A and unemployment develops there will be
pressure on wages and prices to fall. The aggregate supply curve will
sr
begin to hi4t back down to AS1 and eventually the economy will return—11—
to Point 1 where output is at the natural rate level and the price level
has returned to its initial value of P1. A continuing rise in the price
level does not occur.
The conclusion of this analysis is that an attempt by workers and
firms to push up their wages and prices cannot by itself trigger a
sustained inflation. Policy makers have to lend a hand by pursuing an
accommodating, activist policy of eliminating high unemployment with
expansionary monetary policy. Another way of stating this is the follow-
ing. A sustained cost—push inflation is also a monetary phenomenon
because it cannot occur without the acquiescence of the monetary
authorities to a hiher rate of money growth.
There is a second way that pursuing the goal ofhighemployment can
lead to inflationary monetary policy: policy makers can set a target for
unemployment that is too low becau5e it is below the natural rate of
unemployment. The consequences of a policy of too low an unemployment
target is depicted in Figure 4.
Because the policy makers target on a level of unemployment below
the natural rate level, the targeted level of real output, marked as
Y in the figure 4, is above the natural rate level ofoutput, V target n
If the economy is initially in long—run equilibrium at Point 1, the
policy authorities will feel that there is too much unemployment because
output is less than the target level.In order to hit their output
target, the policy makers will conduct an expansionary policy that will
shift the aggregate demand curve out to AD2 and the economy will move to
Point A. Because unemployment is now below the natural rate level,wages
and prices will begin t rise, shifting the short—run aggregate supply
curve up to ASer and sending the economy to Point 2. The price level has
now risen from P1 to P2, but the process will notstopthere, TheFigure 4















economy is still operating at an output level below the target and so
the policy makers will shift the aggregate demand curve out again, this
time to AD3. The economy will eventually head toPoint3 and policy
makerswill again shift the aggregate demand curve outward, sending the
economy to Point 4 and beyond.
Our discussion above indicates that the aggregate demand curve can
only be continually shifted outward by a higher rate of money growth and
so the sustained inflation that results from too low an unemployment
target (or equivalently too high an employment target)is again a
monetary phenomenon. This type of inflation is characterized as a
"demand—pull inflation" because itarisesfrom the conscious effort to
shift out the aggregate demand curve. Clearly, policy makers do not
intend to start demand—pull inflations because they do not gain a per-
manently higher levelof output.4 Demand—pull inflations can be ex-
plained, however, by the fact that policy makers may mistakenly think
that the target levelof output is not above the natural rate level,
Before they realize their mistake, they would have started the process
that we see in Figure 4.
Although theoretically we can distinguish between demand—pull and
cost—push inflations, it is much harder to label particular episodes of
inflation as demand—pullor cost—push. Both types of inflation are
associated with high rates of money growth so they cannot be distin-
guished on this basis. However, as Figures 3 and 4 indicate, the demand—
pull inflation will be associated with periods when output is above the
In the aggregate supply and demand diagram above, it might appear as
though a higher level of output can be achieved at the cost of a
higher rate of inflation. Recent evidence which finds that the long—
run Phillips curve is vertical rules out such a long—run trade—off
between inflation and unemployment.natural rate level, while the cost—push inflation is associated with
periods when output is below the natural rate level. It would then be
quite easy to distinguish which type of inflation is occurring ifwe
knew what the value of the natural rate of unemployment or output is.
Unfortunately, the economics profession has not been able to ascertain
the value of the natural rate of unemployment or output with a high
degree of confidence.
In any case, the distinction between demand—pulland cost—push
inflations is not important. Whether it is the government that initiates
the inflation or workers and firms is irrelevant; the ultimate source of
either type of inflation is the commitment of the government to a high
employment target.
Budget Deficits and Inflation
Frequently a government cannot or does not find it politically
feasible to raisetaxes when it needs to increase government spending.
This appears to be the situation for such Latin American countries as
Argentina and this was clearly the- situation that occurred during the
1921—23 German hyperinflation. Similarly, during war time, the need to
rapidly increase military spending results in government expenditure
rising faster than tax revenues. Alternatively, the desire to reduce
taxes in the face of a continuing high level of government spending can
also lead to large budget deficits as currently is the case in the
United States.
Large budget deficits can also be the source of inflationary
monetary policy. When a government is running a budget deficit it must
finance itin either of two ways 1) it can issue bonds, or 2) it can—14—
resort to the printing press by expanding the amount of high—powered
money. The first method of financing the deficit does not have an inde-
pendent effect on the aggregate demand curve separate from any direct
tax or government spending effects, and so it should not have any infla-
tionary consequences. The second method does lead to a continually
growing money supply if the budget deficit persists for asubstantial
period oftime.In the first period, the rise in high—powered money
leads to a rise in the money supply that shifts the aggregate demand
curve out to the right as in Figure 2. In subsequent periods if the
budget deficit is still present, then it has to be financed again,
leading to a rise in high—powered money, a rise in the money supply, and
another outward shift in the aggregate demand curve. A sustained infla—
tion will thus occur if a large budget deficit is persistent and itis
financed by issuing high—powered money.
The key question that requires an answer in order to understand the
link between budget deficits arid inflation is why do governments with
budget deficits finance them by creating high—powered money rather then
by issuing bonds? Ifa government does not have access to a capital
market that can absorb its bonds in substantial quantities, then the
answer is straightforward. The only way the budget deficit can be
financed is by printing money. This appears to be the situation in Latin
American and many other developing countries, and in these countries the
link between budget deficits and inflationary monetary policy is quite
5
clear.
ven in a country where well developed capital markets exist that
can absorb substantial quantities of bonds, if the budget deficit is a
For example, see Arnold Harberger (1981).—15—
sufficiently large fraction of GNP and is permanent, a policy of pure
bond financing will be dynamically unstable, leading to an explosion in
the stock of debt. Once the public recognizes that this will occur, then
the government will not be able to sell enough of its bonds to com-
pletely finance the deficit and will be forced to issue high—powered
6
money.
The case for an important role of budget deficits in the inflation-
ary process is much less clear cut when the economy has a well developed
bond market in which the government can sell its bonds and when the size
of the budget deficit is small relative to SNP. Although a government
may not have to finance its deficit by increasing the amount of high—
powered money, it still may end up doing so because its it has a goal of
preventing rises in interest rates. A common view is that budget
deficits, which require the issuing ofa large amount of government
bonds, raise the level of interest rates. This view has intuitive appeal
because in a usual supply and demand analysis of the band market the
increased supply of bonds resulting from a deficit leads to a decline in
bond prices and hence a rise in interest rates. If this rise in interest
rates is considered undesirable, the monetary authorities might try to
prevent it by purchasing bonds to prop up their price and by so doing
increase the amount of high—powered money. This monetization of the debt
will then lead to a continuing rise of the money supply if the deficit
persists and so will lead to inflation through the mechanism depicted in
the aggregate supply and demand diagram of Figure 2.
The evidence that budget deficits have led to higher interest rates
in the U.S. is not strong. This might be the result, however, of map—
See Sargent and Wallace (1981) and McCallum (1982).—to—
propriate measurement of the budget deficit. The NationalIncome Ac-
counts deficit, which is the deficit number that is most widely cited in
the popular press is a particularly flawed measure of the government
budget deficit because it does not make any correction for inflation,
Although in the period 1946 to i980 there were some substantial deficits
ona National Income Accounts basis, when corrected for inflation these
deficits disappear.7 This is reflected in the fact that the real per
capita level of net federal debt has fallen steadily from 1946 to 1980.
Only in the last few years have we begun to see large budget deficits
(correctly measured) and a rise in the level of federal dect as a frac-
tion of GNP. Thus it is not surprising that the past search for higher
interest rates as a result of budget deficits in the United States has
not found strong supporting econometric evidence.
The current Reagan budget deficits, even when measured correctly,
are unprecedentedly high for the postwar period. Ifthesedeficits
persist, we then may find stronger evidence in the future that budget
deficits do matter to the level of interest rates and therefore have a
potential stimulative effect on monetary policy.8 The evidence on the
link between budget deficits and inflationary monetary policy is,
however, inconclusive at the present time,
7
See Eisner and Pieper(1984),
Blanchard and Summers (1984) make the case that when viewed in an
international context, the currently high budget deficits in the
U.S. are not the source of the current high levels of real interest
rates. Thus, their analysis casts some doubt on the position that
the current U.S. budget deficits will ultimately prove to be infla—
ti anary.—17—
The Rise in Core Inflation in the U.S.
The analysis above provides us with some clues at to why the core
inflation rate rose from the early 1960s to the late 1970s. Because the
inflation—adjusted budget deficit was never substantial during this
period, there is little support, either on a theoretical or empirical
basis, for budget deficits as the source of the rise in the core infla-
tion rate. This leaves high employment targets as the other candidate
for the underlying cause ofthehigher rate of money growth and the rise
in core inflation.
A likely scenario for what triggered the rise in core inflation in
the 1965—73 period is that policy makers pursued an overly high employ-
ment target. In the mid 1960s, policy makers, economists and politicians
became committed to a target unemployment rate of 47. because they
thought that this levelof unemployment was consistent with price
stability, In hindsight, most economists now agree that the natural rate
of unemployment was above this figure and was steadily rising in the
late 1960s and 1970s to above 6'!. because of demographic shifts in the
composition o4 the labor force and increased coverage of unemployment
insurance programs. The activist policy during the Johnson and Nixon
administrations which pursued unemployment targets that were too low
(and thus employment targets which were too high) might then be the
primary reason why a temporary inflation resulting from the Vietnam war
buildup in the mid 1960s was converted into a sustained rise in infla-
tion along the lines of Figure 4.
The attempt of workers and firms to obtain higher wages and prices
could also have been a factor in the rise of the core inflation rate,
but it is important to remember that these cost—push elements of infla—-18-
tion could not have occurred without the accommodating high employment
policy of the monetary authorities shown in Figure 3. The persistence of
the high core inflation rate into the late 1970s can be attributed to
workers and firms knowledge that government policy continued to be
concerned with achieving high employment; they thus continued to raise
their wages and prices because they expected accommodating policy. This
raises the issue that expectations are an important element in the
inflationary process and leads us to the role of credibility of policy
makers in eliminating and preventing inflation.
Iv.
Credibilityand Expectations in the anti—Inflation Process
Monetarists have always been leery of activist policy because they
see the economy as inherently stable and because there is some uncer-
tainty about the timing of monetary policy effects (long and variable
lags). They thus see activist policy as likely to do more harm than
good. Keynesians on the other hand are much less sanguine about the
stability of the economy because they view price and wage adjustment as
proceeding quite slowly because of rigidities such as long—term con-
tracts. Does this mean that an activist policy of preventing high
employment is desirable' The answer depends crucially on whether expec-
tations are important in the wage and price setting process.
Figure 5 depicts a situation where the economy has moved to exces—
sive unemployment at Point as a result of an upward shift in the
short—run aggregate supply curve from AS to AS. This upward shift
could arise from an attempt by workers and firms to raise their wages
and prices or could arise from a supply shock of the type we experiencedAggregate
Price Level (P)
Figure 5









Y Aggregate Real Output (Y)—19—
in 1973 ar1979. A non—activist policy that left the aggregate demand
curve at AD1 and allowed high unemployment would eventually drive the
short—run aggregate supply curve back down to AS and real output would
be restored to the natural rate level, In the monetarist or new classi-
cal macroeconomics view of the world, this adjustment would take place
quickly and so the non—activist policy would have low cost.To a
Keynesian the adjustment process would be very slow and substantial
output loss would result from the non—activist policy. Since the ten-
dency to return to the natural rate of output is too slow, the only way
to eliminate the excessive unemployment quickly is too shift out the
aggregate demand curve to AD2 to move the economy to Point 2.
Inan economy where expectations do not matter to wage and price
setting behavior, this accommodating, activist policy is optimal if the
adjustment to the natural rate of output is slow. In an economy where
expectations do matter to wage and price setting, however, we must ask
two questionsi Will the economy remain at Point 2 after the accommodat-
ing policy has been executed, and will the economy be any more likely to
move from Point 1 to Point A in the first place if workers and firms
expect this high employment policy?
As we have seen in Figure 3, the accommodating policy that moves
the economy from Point A to Point 2 may encourage workers and firms to
raise wages and prices further thus leading to a 5ustained inflation. In
addition,if workers and firms know that an accommodating policy is
going to be pursued they will be more likely to try and raise their
wages and prices in the first place, thus moving the economy to a situa-
tion like Point A with high unemployment. Because o4 these two pos-
sibilities there is a hidden cost to the activist high employment
policy.—20—
The problem with the accommodating, activist policy is the dynamic
inconsistency of such a policy described by Kydland and Prescott (1977).
Although the first time that unemployment develops eliminating it with
an activist policy may be optimal, the expectations that this activist
policy creates leads to a suboptimal outcome of higher inflation and
even possibly higher unemployment as well. A hidden benefit of a non—
activist, non—accommodating policy is that movements to Point Ain
Figure 5 may occur less often because workers and firms recognize that
their will be substantial costs in terms of persistent high unemployment
as a result of any attempts to raise wages and prices.
Two non—economic examples illustrate why non—accommodating policies
may be optimal as a result of dynamic inconsistency of accommodating
policy. First is a problem that I have recently experienced as a new
father with a two year old son, I have an office in my house where Ido
much ofmy work. Whenever I went into this office, my son would come,
bang on the door and cry. The first time he did this, it was optimal for
me to pursue an accommodating policy of going out to him. Unfortunately,
he would keep on coming back to the door and disrupting my work, Having
read Kydland and Prescott's paper, I recognized that I would be better
off pursuing a non—accommodating policy. (Who says that economics isn't
useful?) Sure enough, after not going out to him several times when he
came to the door——a wrenching experience because of his crying——he
stopped coming back. Now as a result of my non—accommodating policy, I
can work in peace in my office.
A second example is relevant to the appropriate way to conduct
foreign policy. When Hitler threatened war if he were unable to dismem-
ber Czechoslovakia, it may have appeared optimal to pursue the accom-
modating policy of obtaining peace at any price. Unfortunately, this—21—
just whetted Hitler's appetite for more territorial acquisitions and
encouraged him to invade Poland. In hindsight, the world would have been
better off if the allies had pursued a non—accommodating policy of
stopping Hitler earlier,
4 non—accommodating policy willbe most successful ifeconomic
agents expect it, that is, if the non—accommodating policy is credible.
In the case of Figure 5, knowing that the aggregate demand curve will
not be shifted out if the economy is pushed to Point A will make it less
likely that the economy will end up at Point 4; workers and firms now
recognize that pushing up the aggregate supply curve willentail sub-
stantial costs. Ifcredibility of a non—accommodating policy is not
achieved and is then actually pursued we have the unhappy outcome of
stagflation in which both prices and unemployment rise because movement
to Point A in Figure 5 is a likely possibility. The undesirable outcome
of a non—credible, non—accommodating policy had even more seriousconse-
quences in 1939 when World War II began.
What if we are already experiencing a rapid inflation? What role
does credibility play in the success of an anti—inflation policy?Again
we can use the aggregate supply and demand framework to analyze the
response to an anti—inflation policy. Figure 6 depicts a sustained
inflation in which the economy is moving from Point I to Point 2 each
period and the inflation rate is built in to wage and price contracts so
that the short—run aggregate supply curve is rising at the same rateas
the aggregate demand curve. Consider the announcement of a coldturkey,
anti—inflation policy where money growth will be reduced sufficientlyso
that the aggregate demand curve will remain atAD1 and will not shift
out to AD2. If this anti—inflation policy is not credible, the short—run
aggregate supply curve will continue to rise to 49r when the policy isAggregate
Price Level (P)
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implemented. The result is that the economy will move to Point A where
there is some slowing of inflation (the price level does not rise all
the way to P2) ,butthere is substantial output loss.
If, on the other hand, the announced cold turkey policy were
believed because the policy makers had credibility, a much more
desirable outcome can result. If expectations of future policy do enter
into workers and firms wage and price setting decisions, then the an-
nouncement of the credible cold turkey policy will cause the short—run
aggregate demand curve to rise less than it otherwise would, In an
economy where expectations of future policy do matter but wage and price
contracts impose some wage and price rigidity on the economy, theag-
gregate supply curve will not rise toAS but instead will rise only to
ASB
.Herethe economy moves to Point B and does experience a loss in
output, but this loss is less than is experienced when the policy is not
credible; in addition, the decline in inflation is more rapid (the price
level only rises to rather than to Credibility is thus an impor-
tant element to a successful anti—inflation policy.9
This conclusion is even stronger in the context of the new classi-
cal macroeconomics model.In this model, there is sufficient wage and
price flexibility so that the short—run aggregate supply curve responds
fully to changes in expectations about future policy: the announcement
of the credible cold turkey policy will cause the short—run aggregate
supply curve to remain at AS. Thus, when the cold turkey policy is
implemented, the economy will remain at Point I with the happy outcome
Taylor (1982) has shown that a more gradual approach to reducing
inflation may be able to eliminate inflation without producingany
output loss.One criticism of his conclusion, however, is that
establishing credibility with such a gradual approach may be in-
feasible.-23—
of an inflation rate that has returned to zero which is achieved with no
output loss.
The crucial element required for credibility to matter to the
success of anti—inflation policy is that expectations of policy affect
the position of the short—run aggregate supply curve. The notorious
instability of the Phillips curve provides indirect evidence that expec-
tations about future policy matter to aggregate supply. More direct
tests such as Lucas (1973) also support the importance of expectations
to aggregate supply. The evidence on whether short-run aggregate supply
responds fully to changes in expectations about future policy is more
mixed however.10
Strong direct evidence supporting the icnportance of credibility to
a successful anti—inflation program has been provided by Sargent (1982)
which studies the end of four hypirinflatlons.Inthm hypmrn41tions
that Sargent studies, inflation was eliminated quickly with little
apparent output loss. A key characteristic of these successful cases of
anti—inflation policy is their credibility. The threat of Intervention
by foreign powers made credible the fiscal reforms that eliminated the
huge budget deficits and ended rapid money growth. In a related but
somewhat more controversial paper,'1 Sargent contends that the Poincare
anti—inflation program in France in the 1920s was more successful than
the Thatcher program because Poincare's program established credibility
by pursuing budget reforms while Thatcher's program did not.
Does evidence from the recent disinflationary experience in the
United States shed light on whether credibility is an important factor
10For example see Barro (1977), Gordon (1982), and Mishkin (1983).
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to the success of an anti—inflation program? Ifoneassumes as in Perry
(1983) that a shift to an anti—inflationary monetary policy regime did
occur with the change in the Federal Reserve operating procedures in
October 1979, then a believer in the importance of credibility might
expect to see a more rapid decline in wage and price inflation since
1979 than would be predicted by traditional Phillips curves estimated
from pre—1979 data. Several recent papers CPerry (1983), Eckstein
(1984), and Blanchard (1984)] have found no evidence that traditional
Phillips curve equations have undergone structural shifts in the 1979—83
period, while Cagan and Fellner (1983) and Fisher (1984) do find that
wage inflation has declined more rapidly than would be predicted bya
traditional Phillips curve. Does evidence which tends to show that large
overpredictions by traditional Phillips curves do not occur in the 1979—
83 period cast doubt on the importance of credibility to the behavior of
aggregate supply? The answer is no.
An important point raised by Taylor (1984) is that the switch from
interest rate targeting to reserve targeting by the Federal Reserve
starting in October 1979 does not imply that there was a significant
change to an anti—inflation policy regime. Talor (1984) finds that
there was some shift to a less accommodative policy regime, but the
change was not dramatic. Blanchard (1984) looks at an equation describ-
ing the term structure of interest rates and he finds that there is no
evidence that the financial markets believed that a change to an anti—
inflation policy regime had occurred. The conclusion that arises from
this evidence is that the recent disinflationary experience cannot
provide atest of the importance of credibility to anti—inflationary
policy because a credible, anti—inflation policy never occurred. This
should not be very surprising considering the budgetary policy pursuedby the Reagan administrationt the hi4t to large budget de4i:its ae a
result o4 the Reagan tax cuts would rothelppromote confidence a
continuing anti—inflation monetary policy.—26—
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